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Paul C. Onderick

INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit has made many decisions in the last
decade that have limited the application of the doctrine of
equivalents. Even before the Supreme Court weighed in on
Festo Corp. v. Skoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki (Festo
1
(2000)), there was evidence that the Federal Circuit had gone
too far. In several recent pre-Supreme Court decisions, the
judges of the Federal Circuit stretched to make decisions that
nibbled at the edges of the Federal Circuit’s own absolute bar to
the doctrine of equivalents. This comment looks at an example
of the Federal Circuit working very hard to avoid applying the
rule of Festo (2000) even though the facts of the case seemed to
demand it.
The
TurboCare
Division
of
Demag
Delaval
Turbomachinery Corp. (TurboCare) originally filed suit against
General Electric Co. (GE) in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts asserting infringement of U.S.
Patent No. 4,436,311 (the ‘311 patent) issued to Ronald E.
2
Brandon. The district court granted summary judgment in
3
favor of GE. TurboCare appealed to the Court of Appeals for
4
the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit held, inter alia, that
an amendment made to a patent claim in response to a
This article is available in its original format at http://mipr.umn.edu.
Paul Onderick expects to graduate from the University of Minnesota Law

School in the spring of 2003. He is an articles editor on the board of the
Minnesota Intellectual Property Review, a patent agent registered to practice
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1. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2. TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. General
Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1113-15 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
3. Id. at 1113.
4. Id.
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rejection based on prior art could make the claim patentable
over the prior art without narrowing the scope of the claim, and
thus retain the benefit of the doctrine of equivalents for that
5
claim element.
This case raises a number of issues. First, why was the
Federal Circuit backing away from its decision in Festo (2000)?
Second, is it possible to amend a patent claim to make it
patentable over prior art while at the same time not narrowing
its scope?
Two years later, in 2002, the Supreme Court vacated the
Federal Circuit’s Festo (2000) decision but did not return the
law to the same state it was in prior to the Federal Circuit’s
action in that case. The Supreme Court’s decision relieved the
Federal Circuit of the need to stretch for grounds to allow
patentees the benefit of the doctrine of equivalents after they
have amended claims. However, the Supreme Court decision
still left an unexplained and inexplicable variation between the
treatment
of
amendment-based
and
argument-based
prosecution history estoppel.
This comment suggests a manner of dealing with the
relationship between the several types of prosecution history
estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents that is better than the
current contrary standards used by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Part I describes the state of the law related to
prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents.
Part II describes the TurboCare v. GE decision and considers
how the decision demonstrates the difficulty inherent in the
Festo (2000) approach.
Part III suggests an alternative
approach that would create consistency and predictability in
patent infringement cases. The proposed rule attempts to
reconcile and conform the current varying treatments of the
doctrine of equivalents under the theories of argument-based
versus amendment-based estoppel. This comment concludes
that the Festo (2000) doctrine as applied in TurboCare
demonstrates the substantial flaws in that doctrine. The
TurboCare decision shows that Festo (2000) did not create a
significant increase in predictability of outcome, but instead
limited the value of patents, and in the end does not effectively
promote progress in science and the useful arts. Further, this
comment concludes that the Supreme Court has restored the
substantial benefit of the doctrine of equivalents to patentees
5. Id. at 1126.
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who have amended claims. Still, the Supreme Court has not
gone as far as it could have or should have to make the
application of prosecution history estoppel to the doctrine of
equivalents rational, consistent and predictable.
I. THE STATE OF THE LAW AT THE TIME TURBOCARE
WAS DECIDED
The Constitution of the United States grants Congress the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
6
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
Utilizing this power Congress has passed a series of Patent
7
Acts, the most recent in 1952. The Patent Act defines, among
other things, the circumstances under which the United States
Patent and Trademark Office may grant a patent to an
8
inventor.
A patent grants a right to the inventor to exclude others
9
from making, using or selling the patented invention for a
10
finite period of time. In return the government requires the
inventor to disclose how to make and use the invention in
sufficient detail so that a person skilled in the art to which the
invention pertains can practice the invention without undue
11
experimentation. This disclosure puts the invention into the
public domain so the public can make use of the invention after
the inventor’s period of exclusive right ends. The disclosure
also makes the inventor’s knowledge available to the public so
that others may improve upon the invention even while the
12
inventor retains the patent right.
The patent disclosure serves several other purposes. First,
the patent defines the limits of the patentee’s right to exclude

6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-188 (2000).
8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-105 (2000).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(2000).
10. Presently, the term of a utility patent is twenty years from the date of
filing of the application. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
11. The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
12. See id.
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others from practicing the invention.
This public notice
function advises others of the boundaries of the property right
14
Ideally, others can examine the
granted to the patentee.
patent and avoid making, using, or selling the patented
invention and avoid liability to the inventor for patent
15
infringement.
According to 35 U.S.C. § 112, “[t]he specification shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
16
Patent claims are intended to
regards as his invention.”
clearly and specifically define the invention. In practice, the
patent applicant prepares a patent disclosure including a
specification and drawings (if the invention can be better
17
understood by their inclusion). In addition to the claims, the
specification includes a detailed written description of how to
18
make and use the invention. The specification must provide
sufficient detail so that “any person skilled in the art” can
19
make and use the invention without undue experimentation.
Once the applicant has submitted the written description
to the patent office she is precluded from adding any new
20
The written description
matter to the specification.
requirement of § 112 along with the “new matter prohibition”
serve to assure that the applicant actually has possession of the
21
invention at the time that the patent application is filed. The
Patent Office, upon receiving the application, examines the
claims for compliance with required form and structure, and
also searches prior art for similar patents and non-patent
information in an effort to determine whether the disclosed
22
Patent examiners are
invention is novel and unobvious.
trained to construe the claims broadly for the purposes of
examination in order to find as much related prior art as
13. See KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE 3.1 (Patent Resources Institute, Inc.
6th ed. 1998).
14. See id.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
19. See Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). The “person of ordinary skill” is not specifically defined but is
somewhat analogous to the “reasonable person” of tort law.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2000).
21. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 132.
22. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 131 (2000).

2002]

NARROWING CLAIM AMENDMENT

127

23

possible.
The novelty requirement is based on the belief that in
order to advance the sciences and useful arts, inventors need
an incentive to produce that which is new and not previously
24
known. A corollary belief is that there is no need to grant an
25
incentive to produce that which society already possesses. An
obvious invention is one that society would acquire even
26
Society need not provide a
without the patent incentive.
reward for creation of an obvious invention, because an obvious
invention would become available without a providing a
27
reward.
During the examination process, the examiner compares
the scope of the claimed invention to the prior art and rejects
those claims that define an invention already in the public
domain (novelty) or that do not differ substantially from what
28
is already in the public domain (obviousness). The examiner
29
responds to the applicant in the form of an office action. The
office action memorializes the examiner’s rejections and
30
reasoning in writing.
Upon receiving the office action, the applicant may respond
in a variety of ways. The applicant may amend the claims to
narrow them in order to avoid the prior art that the examiner
31
The applicant may argue that the examiner is
has cited.
misinterpreting the meaning of the claims in light of the
32
In addition, the applicant
description in the specification.
may point out errors in reasoning or application of the prior art
33
to the examiner without amending the claims. This is often

23. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111 (United States
Patent and Trademark Office, 8th ed., 2001).
24. Joseph S. Cianfrani, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, para. 35 (Spring 1997) at
http://vjolt.student.virginia.edu/graphics/vol1/vol1_art1.html.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2000).
29. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at § 707;
37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2000).
30. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2000).
31. Richard L. Schwaab, Applicant’s Reply to Patent Office Action, in 4
PATENT PRACTICE 15.2 (Irving Kayton & Karyl S. Kayton eds., 6th ed. 1998).
32. Id. at 15.13.
33. Cianfrani, supra note 24, para. 36.
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referred to as narrowing by argument. Through this process
of negotiation, referred to as prosecution of the patent
application, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) and the applicant usually reach an agreement as to
35
the scope of the claimed invention and the patent issues.
Alternatively, the applicant may choose to abandon the
36
application. This generally occurs if the invention disclosed is
clearly anticipated by the prior art. The applicant may choose
abandonment if the invention turns out to be commercially
unsuccessful or if the expense or burden of pursuing the
application is too great compared to the potential reward.
The patent applicant’s motivation throughout the
application procedure is to acquire the broadest possible
37
To this end, patent applications have
exclusionary right.
historically been filed with broad claims that would be
narrowed during prosecution as required to meet the
38
Recent dramatic changes in patent
examiner’s rejections.
case law have made reliance on this conventional approach to
prosecuting the claims of the patent application inadvisable.
A. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
In the mid 1800s, courts in the United States began using
39
the doctrine of equivalents in order to hold patents infringed.
Courts employed this tactic in cases where the infringing party
had not practiced the invention literally as claimed in the
40
41
patent. In Gould v. Rees, the Supreme Court held that an
accused infringer, who was using well-known substitutes of
42
elements claimed in a patent, still infringed the patent. The
Court explained that “if the substitute performs the same
function and was well known at the date of the patent as a
proper substitute for the omitted ingredient” it is an

34. Interviews with Bradley D. Pedersen, Patent Attorney, Partner,
Patterson, Thuente, Skaar & Christensen, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar.-Aug.,
2001).
35. Cianfrani, supra note 24, para. 9.
36. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at § 711;
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.135, 1.138 (2000).
37. Cianfrani, supra note 24, para. 9.
38. See KAYTON, supra note 13, at 3.1.
39. Cianfrani, supra note 24, para. 9.
40. Id. para. 9-16.
41. 82 U.S. 187 (1872).
42. Id. at 194.
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“alteration” and still infringes the patent.
The Supreme Court defined the modern doctrine of
44
equivalents in Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products. In Graver
Tank, the patentee claimed a process and flux for high speed,
45
The flux, as
single pass arc welding of thick metal plates.
claimed, was comprised of an alkaline earth metal silicate and
46
calcium fluoride. The specification revealed that the preferred
metal silicate was magnesium silicate, but evidence showed
47
that manganese silicate would work just as well. However,
48
manganese is not an alkaline earth metal. Graver Tank Co.
and other alleged infringers used a flux based on manganese
49
50
silicate, and avoided literal infringement of the claim. The
patentee argued that the manganese silicate flux was
equivalent to the patented flux and therefore infringed the
51
patent.
In Graver Tank, the Supreme Court defined what has come
to be known as the triple identity or “function, way, result” test
52
If a product performs the
for the doctrine of equivalents.
same function, in substantially the same way, achieving
substantially the same result as the claimed invention, it
infringes the patent claim despite being outside the claim’s
53
The Court observed that, “[o]utright and
literal language.
forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of
54
infringement.” Emphasizing the inventor protection function
of patents the Court continued, “[t]o prohibit no other would
place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be
55
subordinating substance to form.” The court also recognized
the public benefit of the patent system by explaining that the
absence of a patent system “would deprive [the inventor] of the
benefit of his invention and would foster concealment rather
43. Id.
44. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
45. Cianfrani, supra note 24, para. 18 (giving additional history about
Graver Tank).
46. 339 U.S. at 610.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 612.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 608.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 607.
55. See id.
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than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the primary
56
purposes of the patent system.” The Graver Tank Court also
sought to guide the lower courts:
In determining whether an accused device or composition infringes a
valid patent, resort must be had in the first instance to the words of
the claim.
If accused matter falls clearly within the claim,
infringement is made out and that is the end of it.
But courts have also recognized that to permit imitation of a patented
invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert
the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.
Such a limitation would leave room for—indeed encourage—the
unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes
and substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing, would
be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, and hence
outside the reach of law. One who seeks to pirate an invention, like
one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted book or play, may be expected
57
to introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy.

Later, in Warner-Jenkinson Co. Inc., v. Hilton Davis
58
Chemical Co, the Court clarified that the triple identity test
for the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to each element
59
of a claim individually, not to the invention as a whole. The
Court also expressed concern that the application of the
doctrine of equivalents not “vitiate the central functions of the
60
In other words, the doctrine of
patent claims themselves.”
equivalents must not be applied to an element in such a way as
61
to “eliminate that element in its entirety.”
B. PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL
The prosecution history, or file wrapper, of a patent is the
written record of correspondence between the patent applicant
62
The
and the USPTO, generated during patent prosecution.
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is related to, but
63
The main difference
distinct from, equitable estoppel.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
59. See id. at 29.
60. Id. at 30.
61. Id. at 29.
62. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.05 (2001).
63. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 509-10 (Pocket Ed. 1996).
The
definition of prosecution history estoppel is the following: “[I]n patent law, the
doctrine preventing a patent holder from invoking the doctrine of equivalents
if the holder, during the application process, surrendered certain claims or
interpretations of the invention.” Id.
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between the two doctrines is that prosecution history estoppel
64
does not require reliance.
Prosecution history estoppel
precludes a patentee from using the doctrine of equivalents in
an infringement suit to regain claim coverage that was given
65
up in order to obtain the patent. During the give and take of
patent prosecution, the patent applicant may surrender
claimed subject matter for a variety of reasons in order to
66
The courts apply prosecution history
obtain the patent.
estoppel to prevent the patentee from later claiming
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for previously
67
Therefore, prosecution history
surrendered subject matter.
estoppel limits the doctrine of equivalents by preventing the
use of the doctrine from vitiating the public notice and scope68
defining functions of patent claims.
1. Writing the Patent Claim
When writing a patent claim, a practitioner lays out a
69
certain number of claim elements and their interrelation.
Traditionally, a practitioner can amend a claim to narrow it in
70
several ways.
The claim drafter may add one or more
71
elements to the existing claim.
The addition of an element
narrows the claim because of the open-ended nature of most
72
patent claims.
Most patent claims use the open-ended transitional term
73
“comprising.”
The use of the term “comprising” creates an

64. See id.
65. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 614
(1950) (arguing that a patent claim is “not like a nose of wax, which may be
turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so
as to make it include something more than or something different from, what
its words express” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting White v.
Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886))).
66. It is sometimes more efficient to surrender some patentable subject
matter in return for an early allowance of a patent application than to expend
the time, effort and expense necessary to receive broader claim coverage at a
later date. Further, the patent office allows continuing applications to be filed
to allow later pursuit of the broader claims, if that is appropriate and desired.
67. See supra text accompanying note 65.
68. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 29 (1997).
69. See generally KAYTON, supra note 13, at 3.1.
70. See id. at 3.2-3.11.
71. Id. at 3.3.
72. See id. at 3.2-3.3.
73. Id. at 3.2.
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open-ended claim that will be read onto anything that includes
all the elements listed, no matter what additional elements
74
Adding an element, therefore, removes all
may be present.
items that do not contain that element from the universe of
75
objects that might infringe that claim.
76
The practitioner may also add a limitation to the claim.
Adding a limitation modifies or qualifies an element already set
77
forth in the previous claim. Finally, the Federal Circuit has
held that a claim that is subject to two possible constructions,
and that has an enabling disclosure indicating the applicant is
at least entitled to a claim having the narrower of the two
constructions,
should
always
adopt
that
narrower
78
construction.
2. Amendment-Based Estoppel
In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the
Supreme Court considered arguments claiming that the 1952
Patent Act had negated the doctrine of equivalents as
79
presented in Graver Tank. The Court held that the doctrine
80
had survived the 1952 Act, but also held that Graver Tank
“did not dispose of prosecution history estoppel as a legal
81
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.”
In addition, the
Court held that the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to
individual claim elements, and not to the invention as a
82
whole. The Court also held that the inquiry into equivalents
is properly based on the state of knowledge at the time of
83
infringement.
Further, the Court highlighted the legal concept that the
reason for amending a claim plays a role in the application of
84
The Court chastised the
prosecution history estoppel.
“petitioner [for] reach[ing] too far in arguing that the reason for
74. Id. at 3.3.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 3.8-3.11B.
77. Id. at 3.8.
78. See, e.g., Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
79. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
25 (1997).
80. Id. at 28.
81. Id. at 30.
82. Id. at 29.
83. Id. at 37.
84. Id. at 32-33.
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an amendment during patent prosecution is irrelevant to any
85
subsequent estoppel.” The Court held that a presumption of
prosecution history estoppel would apply unless the patentee
proved that the amendment was made for a purpose unrelated
86
to patentability. The Court also suggested that “reasons
related to patentability” meant amendments made to avoid
prior art or to address concerns of obviousness over the prior
87
art. If a claim element was amended to avoid the prior art,
the patentee would be estopped from expanding that element to
include the prior art in order to prove infringement. Beyond
these definitions, the Court failed to explain how to determine
88
what reasons for amendment are related to patentability.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
89
Circuit) considered this question en banc in 2000. The answer
dramatically narrowed the application of the doctrine of
90
equivalents. Apparently, the Federal Circuit felt a guarantee
of certainty in the public notice function of patent claims,
created by a bright-line rule, was more important than
91
protecting the rights of patentees.
In Festo (2000), the Federal Circuit answered several
questions. First, the court held that “a ‘substantial reason
related to patentability’ is not limited to overcoming or avoiding
prior art, but instead includes any reason which relates to the
92
statutory requirements for a patent.” “Therefore, a narrowing
amendment made for any reason related to the statutory
85. Id. at 30.
86. Id. at 33.
87. Id. at 30-31.
88. See id.
89. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d
558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
90. See id. The Federal Circuit was careful to state that it used the term
“element” throughout its opinion even though the terms “element” and
“limitation” are used interchangeably to refer to words in a claim. Id. at 563
n.1. Footnote 1 of the decision indicates that “[i]t is preferable to use the term
‘limitation’ when referring to claim language and the term ‘element’ when
referring to the accused device.” To the contrary, Irving Kayton states that
“[e]very practitioner knows that a claim ‘limitation’ is not an element. A
limitation is a modification, characteristic or qualification of an element or a
recitation of some form of cooperation between elements.” PAUL L GARDNER ET
AL., CRAFTING & DRAFTING WINNING PATENTS 1-27 (Patent Resources Group
2000). This appears to be the more common understanding and utilization of
the terms amongst the attorneys and agents that prosecute patent
applications before the Patent and Trademark Office.
91. See 234 F.3d at 567.
92. Id. at 566.
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requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history
93
estoppel with respect to the amended claim element.”
The
court further held that whether the claim amendment was
voluntary, or in response to an office action, made no difference
in the treatment of the claim for purposes of prosecution
94
history estoppel relating to the amended claim element. The
court continued, holding that when the above criteria were met,
the range of equivalents available for the amended claim
95
The court stated, “[a]pplication of the
element is zero.
doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is completely
96
barred.” The court held, “[w]hen no explanation for a claim
amendment is established, no range of equivalents is available
97
for the claim element so amended.”
3. Argument-Based Estoppel
Another way to narrow a claim is by advocating for a
98
different interpretation than that of the patent examiner.
Because a patent applicant can be his own lexicographer and is
often seeking protection for something for which words do not
yet exist; the patentee may define words as terms of art, which
99
have meanings different from their common meaning.
Therefore, in the context of the patent, the applicant may argue
to the examiner that the claim’s words have a particular
100
The applicant may not,
meaning in light of the specification.
however, later try to reclaim what was surrendered in a later
101
In addition, the applicant may argue to
infringement action.
102
distinguish her invention from the prior art.
This may
narrow the definition of the claimed invention without
103
amending the claims.
The standard which the Federal Circuit applies to
argument-based prosecution history estoppel is quite different

93. Id.
94. Id. at 568.
95. Id. at 569.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 578; See also Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc.,
172 F.3d 817, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
98. See, e.g., Sextant Avionique, S.A., 172 F.3d at 822-823.
99. See id. at 825.
100. See, e.g., id. at 825-826.
101. See, e.g., id. at 826.
102. See, e.g., id.
103. See, e.g., id.
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from that promulgated in the Festo (2000) decision. “For an
estoppel to apply, such assertions in favor of patentability must
104
‘evince a clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter,’
105
not an ‘equivocal’ one.”
Further, to determine what subject
matter has been relinquished, an objective test is applied,
inquiring, “whether a competitor would reasonably believe that
106
the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject matter.”
Thus, to be subject to argument-based estoppel, the
107
applicant must unmistakably surrender subject matter.
The
applicant is then only estopped from reclaiming what he clearly
108
Further, the disclaimer is judged
disclaimed in prosecution.
109
by an objective standard.
In contrast, if the applicant
amends a claim element to narrow it, the applicant becomes
subject to amendment-based estoppel, thereby invoking the
110
severe consequence of a total bar on equivalents. The Federal
Circuit has not indicated any justification for this extreme
variation in treatment between amendment-based estoppel and
111
argument-based estoppel.
The Federal Circuit reaffirmed the argument-based
estoppel standard after Festo (2000) in Dow Chemical Co. v.
Sumitomo Chemical Co., by holding that prosecution history
statements made by Dow did “not evince the ‘clear and
unmistakable surrender of subject matter’ necessary to invoke
112
argument-based prosecution history estoppel.”
The Federal Circuit further defined the rule it created in
113
Festo (2000) in Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.
104. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449,
1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
105. Id. (citing Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
106. Id. (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1457 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
107. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Assn. at
5, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1543), available at
http://www.aipla.org/html/briefs/festo2.pdf.
108. See id. at 5-6.
109. See id. at 6.
110. See id. at 5-7.
111. See id.
112. Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1382 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (quoting Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. 140 F.3d 1373, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
113. See 252 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir 2001).
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In Mycogen, claims were not amended during the patent
prosecution process but, instead, were cancelled and replaced
114
The court could not see
with more narrowly defined claims.
“any legally significant difference between canceling a claim
having a broad limitation and replacing it with a claim having
a narrower limitation, and amending a claim to narrow a
115
limitation.”
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit decision in Festo (2000)
has been widely criticized as placing form over substance just
116
It is
as it criticized the appellant for doing in Mycogen.
common in patent prosecution to combine the elements and
limitations present in a dependent claim with those present in
the independent claim from which the dependent claim
117
depends. If the dependent claim is cancelled and merged into
the independent claim the resulting claim is narrowed in scope
118
In contrast, if the
and subject to the Festo (2000) doctrine.
independent claim is cancelled and all of its limitations and
elements combined into the former dependent claim, the
resulting claim has identical scope to its predecessor and is not
deprived of the doctrine of equivalents under the Festo (2000)
119
This is true even though the two amended claims are
test.
120
identical word for word.
C. THE SUPREME COURT RULES
In May 2002, about a year after the TurboCare decision,
the United States Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s
121
Festo (2000) decision.
The Court remonstrated the Federal
Circuit that such a dramatic change in patent law as creating a
complete bar to equivalents was the province of Congress and

114. Id. at 1319.
115. Id. at 1319-20. (explaining that “[t]o do so would place form over
substance and would undermine the rules governing prosecution history
estoppel laid out in Festo by allowing patent applicants simply to cancel and
replace claims for reasons of patentability rather than to amend them”).
116. Interviews with Bradley D. Pedersen, Patent Attorney, Partner,
Patterson, Thuente, Skaar & Christensen, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar.-Aug.,
2001).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S.
722, 122 S.Ct. 1831 (2002).
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not within the power of the appellate courts.
The Supreme
Court scolded the Federal Circuit for ignoring the guidance it
gave in Warner-Jenkinson “which instructed that courts must
be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled
123
expectations of the inventing community.”
The Court agreed that prosecution history estoppel can bar
many equivalents but instructed that what equivalents are
barred “requires an examination of the subject matter
124
The Court also
surrendered by the narrowing amendment.”
reinforced that the purpose of prosecution history is “to hold
the inventor to the representations made during the
application process and to the inferences that may reasonably
125
The claim resulting from
be drawn from the amendment.”
amendment is not “ so perfect in its description [of the claimed
126
subject matter] that no one could devise an equivalent.”
Further, the Court reinforced the secondary function of the
doctrine of equivalents of allowing the patentee to exclude
others from practicing equivalents of the invention that arise
127
from “unforeseeable” later-developed technology.
The Court did, however, hold that “the patentee should
bear the burden of showing that the amendment does not
128
The Court
surrender the particular equivalent in question.”
emphasized that the holding is not “just the complete bar by
129
If the patentee can show that one skilled in
another name.”
the art could not reasonably be expected to draft a claim
literally encompassing the alleged equivalent, the patentee can
130
rebut the presumption that the equivalent has been barred.
The Supreme Court has created a rebuttable presumption that
the patentee has given up “all subject matter between the
131
Implicitly, equivalents
broader and the narrower language.”
outside the range between the amended and the unamended
132
claim are still available to the patentee.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1841.
Id.
Id. at 1840.
Id.
Id. at 1840-41.
Id. at 1842.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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II. TURBOCARE: HOW TO SUCCEED AT CLAIM
DRAFTING WITHOUT REALLY TRYING
A. CASE DESCRIPTION
TurboCare originally filed suit against GE in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4,436,311 (the ‘311
133
The district court
patent) issued to Ronald E. Brandon.
granted a summary judgment motion in favor of GE, holding
that claims one, five, six, and seven were not infringed and that
134
TurboCare appealed to the Federal
claim two was invalid.
135
Circuit.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the invalidity of claim two for
failure to satisfy the written description requirement of 35
136
When Brandon amended claim
U.S.C. § 112 paragraph one.
two during the prosecution of the ‘311 patent he also amended
137
The court found that the
the patent specification.
amendment added new matter to the specification in violation
138
of 35 U.S.C. § 132. Thus, the specification, as originally filed,
did not support claim two as amended, and amended claim two
139
was invalid.
Next, the court considered TurboCare’s challenge to the
district court’s conclusion of non-infringement of claims one,
140
The first step in this analysis was to
five, six, and seven.
141
“determine the meaning and scope” of the claims.
First, the
court considered and rejected that the use of the word “means”
in the claims invoked 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph six and should
142
The court ruled
be treated as a means-plus-function claim.
that the claims in question defined a sufficient amount of
143
structure to not be considered a means-plus-function claim.
GE argued that Brandon had disclaimed all equivalents
133. TurboCare Div. Of Demag Delavel Turbomachinery Corp., v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
134. Id. at 1113.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1120.
137. Id. at 1118-19.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1120.
140. Id. at 1120-26.
141. Id. at 1120.
142. Id. at 1120-21.
143. Id.
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that utilized flat or leaf springs when he argued to distinguish
his invention from prior art disclosed in a British patent issued
144
The court rejected the contention that argument
to Warth.
based
estoppel
prevented
TurboCare
from
alleging
145
In the same
infringement of the ‘311 patent claims.
amendment and response, Brandon added a claim specifically
146
directed to flat springs. Therefore, the court reasoned, he had
147
not disclaimed the use of flat springs.
Next, GE argued that Brandon’s use of the term
148
“compressed spring” means to include a particular location.
Because dependent claims two and four added this restriction
the court relied on the doctrine of claim differentiation to reject
149
GE’s argument.
The court proceeded to construe the claims with regard to
the disputed terms “large clearance position,” “small clearance
150
The court defined the term “large
position,” and “contact.”
151
clearance position” more broadly than the district court’s had.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the
“small clearance position” was one in which the seal ring
segment touched the casing shoulders and that “contact” should
152
The court construed
be read as having its ordinary meaning.
“contact” to mean the seal ring segment directly touching the
casing shoulder as opposed to allowing another material to be
interposed between the seal ring segment and the casing
153
shoulder.

144. Id. at 1122.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1123-24.
151. Id. at 1123. The details of that construction are not material to the
discussion here. The district court defined the large clearance position as
requiring that the outer surface of the inner portion of the seal assembly touch
the inner surface of the casing shoulders. Id. The Federal Circuit indicated
that reading the claim in this fashion imported limitations that were in the
preferred embodiment of the invention into the claims. Id. The Federal
Circuit found no basis for this limitation in the claim itself. Id. Thus the
court construed the claim to include the preferred embodiment as described
but also to include an “arrangement in which there is contact between the
outward facing surface of the outer ring portion of the seal ring segment . . .
and the inward facing surface of the casing groove.” Id.
152. Id. at 1124.
153. Id.
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Next, the court compared the claims as construed to the
154
devices accused of infringement. After determining that none
of the accused devices literally infringed the claims as the court
had construed them, the court considered whether the 1992
Diaphragm Version or the 1995 Version of GE turbine seal
155
The court held
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.
that the devices met all the limitations of the claims except for
156
TurboCare argued that GE
the “small clearance limitation.”
157
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.
GE countered
that the doctrine of equivalents was unavailable to TurboCare
158
due to prosecution history estoppel.
159
GE based its contention on the Festo (2000) decision.
Brandon’s claim one as originally filed did not include a
160
“contact” limitation.
It described a “small diameter position
corresponding to . . . small clearance of the seal ring with
161
regard to the rotating shaft or rotor.” During the prosecution
of the ‘311 patent, claim one, as originally submitted, was
162
cancelled and replaced with a claim that “defined the ‘small
diameter’ or ‘small clearance’ position with reference to contact
163
This amendment was made in
between certain surfaces.”
164
response to a claim rejection over the Warth patent.
GE
argued that this was a narrowing claim amendment for a
reason related to patentability, and therefore, under Festo
(2000), no range of equivalents was available for that claim
165
element.
The court agreed that this analysis was correct, but only if

154. Id. The court considered four accused GE products. Id. They were:
the original version, the 1992 N-2 Version, the 1992 and 1995 Diaphragm
Versions. Id. The court held that the first two devices did not infringe
literally and that Brandon had disclaimed the limitations that would have
caused them to infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. The remaining
two devices did not infringe literally under the court’s analysis. Id. at 112425.
155. Id. at 1125.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.

2002]

NARROWING CLAIM AMENDMENT

141
166

the amendment was in fact a narrowing amendment.
The
court, surprisingly, indicated that the amendment was not a
167
The Federal Circuit panel found the
narrowing one.
limitation of the small clearance position to be present in the
168
The original filed claim did not
original cancelled claim.
specifically state that the small clearance position involved
contact between the seal and the shaft of the turbine, but the
court ruled that was the meaning that the applicant gave to the
169
term “ small diameter position” in the original specification.
The court also pointed out that Figure One of the drawings was
described as depicting the “small clearance condition” and that
170
The court
Figure One showed the seal touching the shaft.
concluded “[h]ere, the newly added claim only redefined the
small clearance position limitation without narrowing the
171
claim. Therefore, Festo [(2000)] is not applicable.”
The court then affirmed the district court ruling aside from
the district court’s judgment that there was no infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents for claims one, five, six and
172
Finally, the Federal Circuit panel remanded the case
seven.
to the district court for reconsideration under its de novo claim
173
construction.
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DE NOVO REVIEW
If the Federal Circuit’s Festo (2000) decision had stood
174
after being considered by the Supreme Court, the question of
what it means to narrow a patent claim by amendment would
have been of enormous importance to those who are in dispute
over whether a claim element is entitled to the doctrine of
equivalents.
Between the Festo (2000) opinion and the
Supreme Court’s 2002 decision, the Federal Circuit repeatedly
used the rule it established in Festo (2000) to invalidate the
application of the doctrine of equivalents for claims construed
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1125-26.
168. Id. at 1125.
169. Id. at 1125-26.
170. Id. at 1126.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and oral arguments were
heard on January 8, 2002. The Court rendered its decision May 28, 2002. The
Court remanded to the Federal Circuit with Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 122 S.Ct. 1831 (2002).
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de novo upon appeal.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit had been
taking a path that seemed bent on eliminating the doctrine of
equivalents, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in Warner176
Jenkinson affirming the validity of the doctrine.
Yet, in
TurboCare the court reached for a holding that a claim element
is entitled to the doctrine of equivalents despite a relatively
available textual argument that the amendment in question
could have been considered a narrowing amendment that
would invoke the complete bar of Festo (2000).
1. Textual Narrowing
In order to consider textual narrowing, it is necessary to
look at the grammatical structure of a patent claim more
thoroughly. The Federal Circuit defined the terms “element”
and “limitation” in dicta in the Festo (2000) decision as being
used interchangeably, but also suggested that “limitation”
should be used to refer to claim language and that “element” be
177
Results of
used to refer to parts of the actual invention.
studies show that hardly any lawyer within the patent bar
178
Indeed,
follows the Federal Circuit’s suggested convention.
according to Irving Kayton “[e]very practitioner knows that a
claim ‘limitation’ is not an element.
A limitation is a
modification, characteristic or qualification of an element or a
179
recitation of some form of cooperation between elements.”
Using the Kayton view as a starting point, one can
consider that elements are generally nouns for apparatus
180
Limitations are generally adjectives or parts of
claims.
181
speech that act like adjectives. For example, if a patent claim
defines a “magnetic sleeve,” the noun “sleeve” is a claim
182
element and the adjective “magnetic” is a limitation.
“Magnetic” is a limitation because it modifies and narrows the
175. See, e.g., Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 238 F.3d 1341,
1344-47 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
176. See supra notes 89-120 and accompanying text.
177. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d
558, 563 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
178. The author questioned over twenty patent attorneys and found none
that followed this convention.
179. See GARDNER, supra note 90, at 1-27.
180. Interviews with Bradley D. Pedersen, Patent Attorney, Partner,
Patterson, Thuente, Skaar & Christensen, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar.- Aug.,
2001).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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meaning of the noun “sleeve.”
A “sleeve presenting two holes
therein” consists of the element “sleeve” and the limitation
184
Once again the limitation
“presenting two holes therein.”
185
modifies, limits or further defines the meaning of “sleeve.”
Such a limitation can be called an adjectival phrase.
Likewise, a magnetic, cylindrical sleeve can be viewed as
186
one element modified by two limitations. If an originally-filed
patent claim defined a cylindrical sleeve, and in response to a
prior art rejection the applicant amended the claim to read “a
magnetic, cylindrical sleeve,” clearly the applicant should be
unable to later argue that under the doctrine of equivalents the
187
claims should read on a sleeve of a non-magnetic material.
However, what if an accused infringer should produce a device
that has a magnetic, octagonal sleeve, that otherwise functions
188
Under the
in an identical fashion to the cylindrical sleeve?
Festo (2000) rule, no literal infringement exists; and the
doctrine of equivalents is not available. Thus, a copyist is free
to duplicate the patented device save for changing the
189
cylindrical sleeve to an octagonal sleeve.
190
For method claims, elements are represented by verbs.
As a practical matter, method claims are written in a series of
191
steps. Each step is a phrase beginning with a verb in present
participle form. For example, a method for baking a cake
comprises the steps of breaking eggs into a bowl, mixing flour
and sugar with the eggs, etc. In this case, the claim element
192
The limitations
would be the verbs “breaking” and “mixing.”
include the nouns that the verbs are acting on, and any adverbs
193
or adverbial phrases that modify or constrain the verbs.
Turning to the TurboCare claims, while the original claim
included references to the small and large clearance positions,
the claim said nothing about how these two states were to be
achieved. After amendment, the claim included the additional

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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limitation that the small clearance position was limited (or
controlled) by contact between certain surfaces in the seal
194
The adjectival phrase defines that the small
assembly.
clearance position occurs when the seal is in contact with the
195
Prior to
shaft, constituting an additional claim limitation.
amendment, the claim would have read on any seal assembly
having a large clearance position and a small clearance
position. After amendment, the claims would read on only
those seal assemblies that control the limit of the small
clearance position by contact between two surfaces defined in
the claim.
Therefore, under this analysis, when the claim was
amended to refer to “contact” rather than “small clearance,” the
claim reduced the scope of the claim coverage.
This
amendment can only be described as a narrowing amendment.
Under Festo (2000) this claim element would not have any
196
benefit of the doctrine of equivalents.
1. Textual reading in light of the specification
The TurboCare court followed this approach closely when it
argued that the “contact” limitation was implied in the “small
197
clearance limitation.”
The claims must, of course, be read in
198
light of the specification.
But a tension exists between
reading the claims in light of the specification, and not
importing limitations from the preferred embodiment into the
199
claims at the same time.
It appears here that the Federal Circuit did not follow its
own jurisprudence when the TurboCare court read a limitation
from the specification into the claim language. While the
specification defined the small clearance position as limited by
the contact between two surfaces, the original claim language
did not. Understanding of the claim language is based on the
specification as a “dictionary for the claims,” but limitations in
the specification should not be read into the claims themselves.
Perhaps the court should reconsider the “nose of wax”

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
1998).

See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech. Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1471 (Fed. Cir.
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200

admonition in White v. Dunbar.
Thus, the court seems to
have erred in deciding that the contact limitation was present
in the original claim.
The numerous dissents in Festo (2000) cried out to the
Supreme Court to offer some clarification on the confusing
decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas in Warner201
Jenkinson.
Perhaps, in this light, the Federal Circuit in the
TurboCare decision was trying to carve itself a back door
escape clause. This escape clause might have allowed the
Federal Circuit to limit the doctrine of equivalents to cases
where such an approach seemed equitable, and to loosen this
doctrine for some cases where a broader scope of claim
interpretation seemed to be the fairer outcome.
Another tension that exists in this area is the presumption
of examiners to construe claims broadly during patent
prosecution while the courts tend to construe claims narrowly
202
A further question is
to uphold validity during litigation.
whether the Federal Circuit should have considered the
specification at all at this point in the claim construction
process. If there is no ambiguity to a claim element in view of a
plain reading of the claim and an understanding of the prior
art, there is no need to refer to the specification. Here it
appears that the court may have utilized the specification only
for the purpose of avoiding the application of Festo (2000).
III.WHY DID THE TURBOCARE COURT TAKE THE ROUTE
THAT IT DID?
It appears that TurboCare was ripe for a decision following
the Festo (2000) approach; yet the court did not take that route.
The application of the TurboCare strategy by the Federal
Circuit suggests several possibilities. First, at least some
justices on the Federal Circuit may have begun to shift their
approach away from Festo (2000). Some members of the patent
bar have argued vigorously that the benefits that the Festo
(2000) majority predicted would accrue after the decision did
203
Perhaps some members of the Festo (2000)
not appear.
majority had second thoughts. Second, many believed that the

200. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
201. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d
558, 598-642 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
202. See supra notes 23 and 78 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
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Festo (2000) decision stifled innovation because it reduced the
204
A rational innovator would not
value of patent protection.
pursue an expensive and protracted process to obtain patent
protection if the inventor knew of a ready-made roadmap for
competitors to defeat the patent. By consulting the patent’s file
history and making insignificant changes to elements of the
invention that were amended in the prosecution process
competitors could easily circumvent the innovator’s patent
claims.
In TurboCare, a larger player in the market was, at least
potentially, free-riding on an innovation made by a smaller
competitor. Perhaps the court felt that total loss of the benefit
of the doctrine of equivalents was too strict a punishment for
amending claims during the prosecution of a patent filed
almost two decades before the Festo (2000) decision.
A. HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
STANDARD WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE DECISION IN
TURBOCARE

In the TurboCare decision the Federal Circuit employed
strained reasoning to reach what seems an equitable decision
protecting the patent rights of TurboCare against infringement
by General Electric. If the TurboCare court had had the benefit
of the Supreme Court’s 2002 Festo decision for guidance would
the result have been different?
Under the Supreme Court’s standard, the Federal Circuit
would not have had to stretch for grounds to maintain the
doctrine of equivalents for TurboCare. The claim amendment
that created the problem in TurboCare was only a problem at
all because of the absolute bar to the doctrine of equivalents
that the Federal Circuit promulgated in Festo (2000).
The Supreme Court’s Festo (2002) indicates that the
patentee only relinquishes subject matter falling between that
described in the cited prior art and the claim scope as it is
amended. The amendment TurboCare made during patent
prosecution did not relinquish the subject matter TurboCare
claimed General Electric had infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents. Since the subject matter in question was not
disclosed in the prior art Warth reference, it was not given up
by the act of amending the claim. Therefore, there was no
reason for it not to be viewed as infringed under the doctrine of
204. See supra text accompanying notes 180-193.
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equivalents.
So, the Federal Circuit could have held that General
Electric infringed the claims of the ‘311 patent without
stretching for a reason why the absolute bar of the doctrine of
equivalents should not apply. Therefore, under the Supreme
Court’s Festo (2002) decision the outcome would have been
clear to the TurboCare court from the outset.
B. THE SAME STANDARD SHOULD BE APPLIED TO ARGUMENTBASED AND AMENDMENT-BASED ESTOPPEL FOR DECIDING
WHAT IS DISCLAIMED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

The Courts should apply the same standard to
amendment-based prosecution history estoppel that applies to
205
argument-based estoppel.
The petitioner in WarnerJenkinson argued for complete elimination of the doctrine of
206
The Supreme Court declined to do so, and
equivalents.
207
instead somewhat narrowed the doctrine of equivalents.
The
Court ruled that the doctrine of equivalents should be applied
to each element of the invention, not to the invention as a
208
Yet in Festo (2000) the Federal Circuit severely
whole.
limited the application of the doctrine of equivalents and went
far beyond the action that the Supreme Court took in WarnerJenkinson. The Federal Circuit thus stepped outside of binding
precedent and made almost any claim amended suffer a bar
209
from the doctrine of equivalents. In TurboCare and the cases
preceding it back to Festo (2000), the Federal Circuit continued
to press for a narrow application of the doctrine of equivalents
while, on a few occasions, bending over backwards to avoid
210
The Supreme Court restored
applying the Festo (2000) rule.
some of the benefit of the doctrine of equivalents to patentees
in its Festo (2002) decision but the question remains: why
should a patent applicant who amends a claim in response to a
prior art-based rejection suffer a greater loss of claim coverage
under amendment-based estoppel than one who gives up claim
coverage by argument? In other words, why should a patentee
who amends a claim have to overcome a presumption that he
does not benefit from the doctrine of equivalents while a
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra note 107-111 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79 and 85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112, 113, and 172 and accompanying text.
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patentee who narrows by argument enjoys a standard that he
must have clearly relinquished the subject matter to lose the
benefit of the doctrine of equivalents?
The standard applied to argument-based estoppel is an
objective test of a “clear and unmistakable surrender of subject
211
Under this standard, the TurboCare petitioner
matter.”
would clearly have had the benefit of the doctrine of
equivalents. The Federal Circuit promulgated the Festo (2000)
bar in part because the majority found the “flexible bar”
212
It is
approach to the doctrine of equivalents unworkable.
apparent from the court’s use of the “clear and unmistakable
surrender” standard in the context of argument-based estoppel
213
that it finds the guideline usable and sufficiently predictable.
With regard to the “clear and unmistakable surrender”
standard the Federal Circuit stated, “[t]his principle
presupposes that the applicant has made the surrender
unmistakable enough that the public may reasonably rely on
214
Thus, even the Federal Circuit agrees that the
it.”
“unmistakable surrender” standard would create the certainty
215
and predictability that it so earnestly desires. In the arena of
infringement litigation, it would also lead to predictability at
least equal to the Festo (2000) rule.
Next, the “unmistakable surrender” standard would fulfill
the constitutionally desirable duty to promote the “progress of
science” by allowing innovators to avoid the “fraud on [their]
216
Broader exercise of the
patent” warned of in Graver Tank.
doctrine of equivalents will increase the value of patents
currently in force and fulfill patentee’s expectations of coverage
217
Applicants
at the time their applications were filed.
prosecuting applications before the Festo (2000) decision had no
way of knowing that a claim amendment made to advance the
prosecution process would lead to severe restriction in the scope
of the patent’s protection years later. The Supreme Court has
eased that burden, but the patentee still must rebut a
211. See supra note 104-106 and accompanying text.
212. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234
F.3d 558, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
213. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
214. Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817, 828 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Litton Sys. Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1458
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
215. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 6 and 56 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 107-111 and accompanying text.
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presumption that a particular equivalent was not given up.
An unmistakable surrender standard for the amendmentbased estoppel rule also would encourage investment in
innovation by providing greater assurance to investors that the
innovator would have the benefit of the temporary right to
218
exclude others from making, using and selling the invention.
This short-term market advantage gives the small innovator
time to become established in order to compete with larger
players. In essence, it gives the startup innovator a fighting
chance to compete with larger, more established companies
without being crushed at the outset by the larger competitor’s
advantages in capital and human resources.
IV.CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit in TurboCare backed away slightly
from the Festo (2000) doctrine in order to allow the patentee a
chance to argue infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
in the district court. The Federal Circuit was forced into this
position because of the fact that the Festo (2000) majority went
too far in limiting the application of the doctrine of equivalents
to be equitable. A better approach to limiting the doctrine of
equivalents in cases of amendment based estoppel is to conform
the rule in order to determine what is barred by prosecution
history estoppel to the “unmistakable surrender” endorsed by
the Federal Circuit for argument based estoppel. The Federal
Circuit approach of setting a draconian bright line standard
and then manufacturing exclusions on a case-by-case basis did
not increase certainty or predictability and seemed only to
create further confusion for patentees and those who seek to
compete with them by attempting to design around valid
patents.
The TurboCare decision illustrates the lack of
predictability that Festo (2000) engendered.
The Supreme Court has since vacated the Federal Circuit’s
Festo (2000) decision. In doing so, the Court has shifted the
balance between prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine
of equivalents in the same direction, though not as far, as
recommended above.
The Supreme Court’s rebuttable
presumption approach does not support the doctrine of
equivalents as clearly as conforming the standard for
amendment-based estoppel to the standard for argument-based
estoppel. The rebuttable presumption standard does not serve
218. See supra note 107-111 and accompanying text.
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the public notice function of patent claims. It is still difficult
for competitors to know where a patentee’s exclusive right ends
and permissible noninfringing, design-around competition
begins. But, the Court’s decision does provide an opportunity
for patentees to demonstrate that a particular equivalent
should not be barred from falling under the ambit of the
doctrine of equivalents. This opportunity restores substantial
value to existing patents that was removed under the Festo
(2000) complete bar standard. The Supreme Court’s creation of
a rebuttable presumption that the patentee has given up “all
subject matter between the broader and the narrower
language” seems to strike an acceptable balance between
protecting the patentee and notifying the public.
There is still, however, no rational justification for the two
different standards. The rebuttable presumption approach
gives patentees a fighting chance to preserve much of the value
of the uncounted patents in force that contain amended claims
while still providing the public with opportunity to legitimately
design around them.
The line between infringing and
designing around is still unnecessarily murky. The burden of a
rebuttable presumption that equivalents are barred still leaves
the patentee in the unenviable position of having to
demonstrate that a particular equivalent was not relinquished
while working from a record created while the applicant had no
idea that he would have to do so.

